Abstract. We present a method to compile Yao's two-player garbled circuit protocol into one that is secure against malicious adversaries that relies on witness indistinguishability. Our approach can enjoy lower communication and computation overhead than methods based on cut-andchoose [13] and lower overhead than methods based on zero-knowledge proofs [8] (or Σ-protocols [14]). To do so, we develop and analyze new solutions to issues arising with this transformation: -How to guarantee the generator's input consistency -How to support different outputs for each player without adding extra gates to the circuit of the function f being computed -How the evaluator can retrieve input keys but avoid selective failure attacks -Challenging 3/5 of the circuits is near optimal for cut-and-choose (and better than challenging 1/2) Our protocols require the existence of secure-OT and claw-free functions that have a weak malleability property. We discuss an experimental implementation of our protocol to validate our efficiency claims.
Introduction
Yao [23] proposed a method that allows two honest-but-curious players-a generator (denoted by P 1 ) with secret input x, and an evaluator (denoted by P 2 ) with secret input y-to jointly compute a function f (x, y) such that P 1 receives nothing and P 2 receives f (x, y). 1 In this paper, we propose an approach for transforming Yao's garbled circuit protocol for honest-but-curious players into a protocol that is secure against malicious players. Our main goal is to improve the efficiency of this transformation and to do so using more general assumptions.
There are two well-known methods to achieve this transformation: the commitand-prove and cut-and-choose. The commit-and-prove method suggested by Goldreich, Micali, and Widgerson [6] only requires the weak general assumption of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. However, this approach requires costly NPreductions, which have never been implemented. On the other hand, an efficient operations per gate, whereas approaches based on the cut-and-choose method require only such expensive operations for the input gates. Nielsen and Orlandi [18] proposed an approach with Lego-like garbled gates. Although it is also based on the cut-and-choose method, via an alignment technique only a single copy of P 1 's input keys is needed for all the e copies of the garbled circuit. However, similar to Jarecki and Shmatikov's approach, each gate needs several group elements as commitments resulting both computational and communicational overhead. Lindell and Pinkas propose a Diffie-Hellman pseudorandom synthesizer technique in [14] ; their approach relies on finding efficient zero-knowledge proofs for specifically chosen complexity assumptions, which is of complexity O(ns).
Our approach to consistency We solve this problem not by explicitly using zeroknowledge protocols (or Σ-protocols) but by communicating merely O(ns) group elements. Our novel approach is to first observe that witness indistinguishable proofs suffice for consistency, and to then use claw-free functions 2 that have a weak malleability property to generate efficient instantiations of such proofs.
Intuitively, P 1 's input is encoded using elements from the domain of the claw-free collections which can later be used to prove their consistency among circuits. The elements are hashed into random bit-strings which P 1 uses to construct keys for garbled input gates. The rest of the gates in the circuit use fast symmetric operations as per prior work. A concrete example is to instantiate the claw-free functions under the Discrete Logarithm assumption by letting f b (m) = g b h m for some primes p and q such that p = 2q + 1, and distinct group elements g and h of Z * p such that g = h = q. It is well-known that such a pair of functions have efficient zero-knowledge proofs. An example instantiation of our solution built on this pair of claw-free functions works as follows: . . , gh m1,s ] are then used to construct garbled circuits in the way that g b h m b,j is associated with P 1 's input bit value b in the j-th garbled circuit. The cut-and-choose method verifies that the majority of the evaluation-circuits are correctly constructed. Let [j 1 , . . . , j e ] be the indices of these evaluation-circuits. At the onset of the evaluation phase, P 1 with input bit x reveals [g x h mx,j 1 , . . . , g x h mx,j e ] to P 2 and then proves that these range elements are the commitments of the same bit x. Intuitively, by the identical range distribution property, P 2 with f x (m x,i ) at hand has no information about x. Furthermore, after P 1 proves the knowledge of the pre-image of [f x (m x,j1 ), . . . , f x (m x,je )] under the same f x , by the claw-free property, P 1 proves the consistency of his input keys for all the evaluation-circuits.
Furthermore, in the course of developing our proof, we noticed that witness indistinguishable proofs suffice in place of zero-knowledge proofs. Even more generally, when the claw-free collection has a very weak malleability property (which holds for all known concrete instantiations), sending a simple function of the witness itself suffices. We will get into more details in §2.1.
It is noteworthy that both the committed-input scheme in [16] and DiffieHellman pseudorandom synthesizer technique in [14] are special cases of our approach, and thus, have similar complexity. However, the committed-input scheme is not known to enjoy simulation-based security, and the pseudorandom synthesizer technique requires zero-knowledge proofs that are unnecessary in our case, which means that our approach is faster by a constant factor in practice.
Two-output Functions
It is not uncommon that both P 1 and P 2 need to receive outputs from a secure computation, that is, the goal function is f (x, y) = (f 1 , f 2 ) such that P 1 with input x gets output f 1 , and P 2 with input y gets f 2 . 3 In this case, the security requires that both the input and output are hidden from the other player. When both players are honest-but-curious, a straightforward solution is to let P 1 choose a random number c as an extra input, convert f (x, y) = (f 1 , f 2 ) into a new function f * ((x, c), y) = (λ, (f 1 ⊕ c, f 2 )), run the original Yao protocol for f * , and instruct P 2 to pass the encrypted output f 1 ⊕c back to P 1 , who can then retrieve her real output f 1 with the secret input c chosen in the first place. However, the situation gets complicated when either of the players could potentially be malicious. Note that the two-output protocols we consider are not fair since P 2 may always learn its own output and refuse to send P 1 's output. However, they can satisfy the notion that if P 1 accepts output, it will be correctly computed.
Related work One straightforward solution is for the players to run the singleoutput protocol twice with roles reversed. Care must be taken to ensure that the same inputs are used in both executions. Also, this approach doubles the computation and communication cost. Other simple methods to handle twooutput functions also have subtle problems. Suppose, for example, P 1 encrypts all copies of her output and has P 2 send these s random strings (or encryptions) in the last message. In a cut-and-choose framework, however, a cheating P 1 can use these random strings to send back information about the internal state of the computation and thereby violate P 2 's privacy. As an example, the cheating P 1 can make one bad circuit in which P 1 's output bit is equal to P 2 's first input bit. If P 2 sends all copies of P 1 's output bit back to P 1 , then with noticeable probability, the cheating P 1 can learn P 2 's first input bit. The problem remains if instead of sending back all bits, only a randomly chosen output bit is sent. Besides, P 1 should not be convinced by a cheating P 2 with an arbitrary output.
As described in [13] , the two-output case can be reduced to the single-output case as follows: (1) P 1 randomly samples a, b, c ∈ {0, 1} n as extra input; (2) the original function is converted into f * ((x, a, b, c), y) = (λ, (α, β, f 2 )) where α = f 1 ⊕ c is an encryption of f 1 and β = a · α + b is the Message Authentication code (MAC) of α, and (3) P 2 sends (α, β) back to P 1 , who can then check the authenticity of the output α = f 1 ⊕c. However, this transformation increases the size of P 1 's input from n bits to 4n bits. As a result, the complexity of P 1 's input consistency check is also increased. A second drawback is that the circuit must also be modified to include extra gates for computing the encryption and MAC function. Although a recent technique [12] can be used to implement XOR gates "for free," the MAC function a · α + b still requires approximately O(n 2 ) extra gates added to the circuit. Since all s copies of the circuit have to be modified, this results in additional communication of O(sn 2 ) encrypted gates. Indeed, for simple functions, the size of this overhead exceeds the size of the original circuit.
Kiraz and Schoenmakers [11] present a fair two-party computation protocol in which a similar issue for two-output functions arises. In their approach, P 2 commits to P 1 's garbled output. Then P 1 reveals the two output keys for each of her output wires, and P 2 finds one circuit GC r which agrees with "the majority output for P 1 ." The index r is then revealed to P 1 . However, informing P 1 the index of the majority circuit could possibly leak information about P 2 's input. As an anonymous reviewer has brought to our attention an unpublished follow-up work from Kiraz [9] , which elaborated this issue (in § 6.6 of [9] ) and further fixed the problem without affecting the overall performance. Particularly, in the new solution, the dominant computational overhead is an OR-proof of size O(s), and the dominant communicational overhead is the commitments to P 1 output keys, where the number of such commmitments is of order O(ns). Their techniques favorably compare to our approach, but we do not have experimental data to make accurate comparisons with our implementation.
Our approach to two-output functions We present a method to evaluate twooutput function f without adding non-XOR gates to the original circuit for f .
In order for P 2 to choose one output that agrees with the majority, similar to Kiraz and Schoenmakers' approach in [11] , we add extra bits to P 1 's input as a one-time pad encryption key by changing the function from f (x, y) = (
, where x, c, y, f 1 , f 2 ∈ {0, 1} n . With this extra random input c from P 1 , P 2 is able to do the majority function on the evaluation output f 1 ⊕ c without knowing P 1 's real output f 1 . Next, P 2 needs to prove the authenticity of the evaluation output f 1 ⊕ c that she has given to P 1 . Here, our idea is that P 1 's i-th output gate in the j-th garbled circuit is modified to output 0||σ sk (0, i, j) or 1||σ sk (1, i, j) instead of 0 or 1, where σ sk (b, i, j) is a signature of the message (b, i, j) signed by P 1 under the signing key sk. In other words, the garbled gate outputs P 1 's output bit b and a signature of b, bit index i, and circuit index j. Therefore, after the circuit evaluation, P 2 hands f 1 ⊕ c to P 1 and proves the knowledge of the signature of each bit under the condition that the j-index for all signatures are the same and valid (among the indices of the evaluation-circuits). Naively, this proof would have been a proof of O(ns) group elements. However, we will show that a witness indistinguishable proof suffices, which reduces the complexity by a constant factor. Furthermore, by using the technique of Camenisch, Chaabouni, and Shelat for efficient set membership proof [4] , we are able to reduce the complexity to O(n + s) group elements.
The problem of Selective Failure
Another problem with compiling garbled circuits occurs during the Oblivious Transfer (OT) phase, when P 2 retrieves input keys for the garbled circuits. A malicious P 1 can attack the protocol with selective failure, where the keys used to construct the garbled circuit might not be the ones used in the OT so that P 2 's input can be inferred according to her reaction after OT. For example, a cheating P 1 could use (K 0 , K 1 ) to construct a garbled circuit but use (K 0 , K * 1 ) instead in the corresponding OT, where K 1 = K * 1 . As a result, if P 2 's input bit is 1, she will get K * 1 after OT and cannot evaluate the garbled circuit properly. In contrast, if her input bit is 0, P 2 will get K 0 from OT and complete the evaluation without complaints. P 1 can therefore infer P 2 's input. This issue is identified by both Mohassel and Franklin [16] and Kiraz and Schoenmakers [10] .
Related work Lindell and Pinkas [13] replace each of P 2 's input bits with s additional input bits. These s new bits are XOR'ed together, and the result is used as the input to the original circuit. Such an approach makes the probability that P 2 must abort due to selective failure independent of her input. This approach, however, increases the number of input bits for P 2 from n to ns. Woodruff later pointed out that the use of clever coding system can reduce the overhead to max(4n, 8s). To be sure, Lindell, Pinkas, and Smart [15] implement the method described in [13] and empirically confirm the extra overhead from this step. In particular, a 16-bit comparison circuit that originally needs fifteen 3-to-1 gates and one 2-to-1 gate will be inflated to a circuit of several thousand gates after increasing the number of inputs. Since the number of inputs determines the number of OT operations, an approach that keeps the number of extra inputs small is preferable. In fact, we show that increasing the number of inputs and number of gates in the circuit for this problem is unnecessary.
Independent of our work, Lindell and Pinkas [14] propose to solve this problem by cut-and-choose OT. This new solution indeed provides a great improvement over [13] and shares roughly the same complexity with our solution. Furthermore, both the cut-and-choose OT and our solution can be built upon the efficient OT proposed by Naor and Pinkas [17] or Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters [19] . However, the particular use the latter OT in [14] needs two independently chosen common reference strings, while our solution needs only one.
Our approach to selective failure Inspired by the idea of committing Oblivious Transfer proposed by Kiraz and Schoenmakers [10] , we solve the problem of selective failure by having the sender (P 1 in Yao protocol) of the OT post-facto prove that she ran the OT correctly by revealing the randomness used in the OT. Normally, this would break the sender-security of the OT. However, in a cutand-choose framework, the sender is already opening many circuits, so the keys used as inputs for the OT are no longer secret. Thus, the idea is that the sender can prove that he executed the OT correctly for all circuits that are opened by simply sending the random coins used in the OT protocol for those instances. We stress that not every OT can be used here. Intuitively, a committing OT is the OT with the binding property so that it is hard for a cheating sender to produce random coins different from what she really used.
A critical point with this approach is that in order to simulate a malicious P 2 , we need to use a coin-flipping protocol to pick which circuits to open. Consequently, P 1 cannot open the circuits to P 2 until the coin-flipping is over; yet the OT must be done before the coin-flipping in order to guarantee a proper cut. So the order of operations of the protocol is critical to security. An efficient committing OT based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is presented in §2.3.
Optimal Cut-and-Choose Strategy
We find that most cut-and-choose protocols open s/2 out of the s copies of the garbled circuit to reduce the probability that P 1 succeeds in cheating. We show that opening 3s/5-out-of-s is a better choice than s/2-out-of-s. In particular, when s circuits are used, our strategy results in security level 2 −0.32s in contrast to 2 −s/17 from [13] and 2 −0.31s from [14] . Although the difference with the latter work is only 1% less, we show the optimal parameters for the cut-and-choose method in Appendix A, thereby establishing a close characterization of the limits of the cut-and-choose method.
Comparison of Communication Complexity
We attempt to compare communication efficiency between protocols that use a mix of light cryptographic primitives (such as commitments instantiated with collision-resistant hash functions) and heavy ones (such as group operations that rely on algebraic assumptions like discrete logarithm). To meaningfully do so, we consider asymptotic security under reasonable assumptions about the growth of various primitives with respect to the security parameter k. We assume that:
1. light cryptographic primitives have size Θ(k); 2. heavy cryptographic operations that can be instantiated with elliptic curves or bilinear groups take sizeõ(k 2 ). 3. heavy cryptographic operations that require RSA or prime order groups over Z take sizeõ(k 3 ).
The size assumption we make is quite conservative. It is based on the observation that in certain elliptic curve groups, known methods for computing discrete logarithms of size n run in time L n (1, 1/2). Thus, to achieve security of 2 k , it suffices to use operands of sizeõ(k 2 ) by which we mean a value that is asymptotically smaller than k 2 by factors of log(k). The computation bound follows from the running time analysis of point multiplication (or exponentiation in the case of Z * p ) algorithms. As we discuss below, for reasonable security parameters, however, the hidden constants in this notation make the difference much smaller. Let k be a security parameter for cryptographic operations, let s be a statistical security parameter, and let |C| be the number of gates in the base circuit computing f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n .
-Jarecki and Shmatikov [8] : For each gate, the number of the communicated group elements is at least 100, including the commitments of the garbled values for input wires, the commitments of the doubly-encrypted entries, and the ZK proof for the correctness of the gate. Moreover, for each input or output wires, a ZK proof for conjunction/disjunction is required. Each of the ZK proofs needs constant number of group elements. Finally, this protocol assumes the decisional composite residuosity problem in an RSA group; thus, each group element is of sizeõ(k 3 ).
-Kiraz [9] : This approach uses an equality-checker framework that requires O(ns 2 ) commitments for checking P 1 's input consistency. They solve the selective failure attack with committing OT as we do. Moreover, to deal with two-output functions, they add n extra bits to P 1 's input, commit to all of P 1 's output keys, which include 2ns commitments and 2ns decommitments, and a zero-knowledge OR-proof of size O(s).
-Lindell and Pinkas [13] : Each of the garbled gates requires 4k space for four doubly-encrypted entries. Thus, for this approach, the communication analysis is as follows: (1) s copies of the base circuit itself require s|C| gates; (2) each of P 1 's n input bits requires s 2 light commitments for the consistency check; (3) P 2 's n input bits require max(4n, 8s) OT's. Also, the MAC-based two-output function computation add additional O(n 2 ) gates to each of the s copies of the circuit and additional 3n bits to P 1 's input. Thus, the overall communication cost to handle two-output function is O(n 2 sk + ns 2 k). The recent work of [14] also considers a more efficient way to implement twoparty computation based on cut-and-choose OT and specific security assumptions. They report 13sn exponentiations and communication of 5sn + 14k + 7n group elements. (Note we count bits above to compare commitments versus other primitives.) Concretely, these parameters are similar to our parameters but rely on more specific assumptions, and do not consider two-party outputs.
For clarity purpose, the standard checks that are required for security have been omitted. For example, in many cases, it is necessary to verify that an element that has been sent is indeed a member of the right group. In some cases, it is implicit that if a player detectably cheats in a sub-protocol, then the other player would immediately abort execution of the entire protocol.
Consistency Check for the Generator's Input
The cut-and-choose approach to compiling Yao circuits ensures that P 1 submits consistent input values for each copy of the evaluation-circuits. Recall that there are e copies of the circuit which must be evaluated. Thus, for each input wire, P 1 must send e keys corresponding to an input bit 0 or 1. It has been welldocumented [16, 10, 22, 13] that in some circumstances, P 1 can gain information about P 2 's input if P 1 is able to submit different input values for the e copies of this input wire. The main idea of our solution is inspired by the claw-free collections 4 defined as follows: 
With the claw-free collections, our idea works as follows: P 2 first generates I by invoking the index generating algorithm G(1 k ), where k is a security parameter. For each of her input bits, , where I = (g, h, p, q) includes two primes p and q such that p = 2q + 1, and distinct generators g and h of Z * p such that
it is a natural solution that P 1 proves in zero-knowledge to P 2 the knowledge of (m
The key insight here is that it is unnecessary for P 1 to hide (m b,ji − m b,j1 ) from P 2 since [m b,j1 , . . . , m b,je ] are new random variables introduced by P 1 and b is the only secret needed to be hidden from P 2 . Simply sending (m b,ji − m b,j1 ) to P 2 will suffice a proof of checking P 1 's input consistency without compromising P 1 's privacy. In other words, given
Note that extra work is only done for the input gates-and moreover, only those of P 1 . All of the remaining gates in the circuit are generated as usual, that is, they do not incur extra commitments. So, unlike solutions with committed OT such as [8] , asymmetric cryptography is only used for the input gates rather than the entire circuit. To generalize the idea, we introduce the following notion. 
. Consider the claw-free collection constructed above under the Discrete Logarithm assumption, we know that it can become a malleable claw-free collection simply by letting
Two-Output Functions
To handle two-output functions, we want to satisfy the notion that it might be unfair in the sense that P 2 could abort prematurely after circuit evaluation and she gets her output. However, if P 1 accepts the output given from P 2 , our approach guarantees that this output is genuine. Namely, P 2 cannot provide an arbitrary value to be P 1 's output. In particular, P 2 cannot learn P 1 's output more than those deduced from P 2 's own input and output.
Recall that it is a well-accepted solution to convert the garbled circuit computing f (x, y) = (f 1 , f 2 ) into the one computing g((x, p, a, b), y) = ((α, β), f 2 ), where α = f 1 + p as a ciphertext of f 1 and β = a · α + b as a MAC for the ciphertext. Since P 2 only gets the ciphertext of P 1 's output, she does not learn anything from the ciphertext. Also, given (α, β), P 1 can easily verify the authenticity of her output. However, we are not satisfied with the additional O(s 2 )
gates computing the MAC (s is the statistical security parameter) to each of the s copies of the garbled circuit, which results in O(s 3 ) extra garbled gates in total. Indeed, the number of extra gates can easily exceed the size of the original circuit when f is a simple function. Hence, we propose another approach to authenticate P 1 's output without the extra gates computing the MAC function.
While our approach also converts the circuit to output the ciphertext of
, we solve the authentication problem by the use of the public-key signature scheme and its corresponding witness-indistinguishable proof. Each bit value of the output of P 1 's output gates is tied together with a signature specifying the value and the location of the bit. On one hand, P 2 can easily verify the signature during the cut-and-choose phase (to confirm that the circuits are correctly constructed). On the other hand, after the evaluation and giving P 1 the evaluation result (f 1 ⊕ c), P 2 can show the authenticity of each bit of the result by proving the knowledge of its signature, that is, the signature of the given bit value from the right bit location. Note that a bit location includes a bit index and a circuit index. In other words, a bit location (i, j) indicates P 1 's i-th output bit from the j-th garbled circuit. While the bit index is free to reveal (since P 1 and P 2 have to conduct the proof bit by bit anyway), the circuit index needs to be hidden from P 1 ; otherwise, P 1 can gain information about P 2 's input as we discussed above. We stress that it is critical for P 2 to provide a signature from the right location. Since during the cut-and-choose phase, many properly signed signatures are revealed from the check-circuits, if those signatures do not contain location information, they can be used to convince P 1 to accept arbitrary output.
Normally, an OR-proof will suffice the proof that the signature is from one of the evaluation-circuits. Nevertheless, an OR proof of size O(s) for each bit of P 1 's n-bit output will result in a zero-knowledge proof of size O(ns). We therefore adopt the technique from [4] in order to reduce the size of the proof to O(n + s). Let S = {j 1 , . . . , j e } be the indices of all the evaluation-circuits. The idea is for P 1 to send a signature of every element in S, denoted by [δ(j 1 ), . . . , δ(j e )]. By reusing these signatures, P 2 is able to perform each OR proof in constant communication. More specifically, after the evaluation, P 2 chooses one evaluation-circuit, say the j l -th circuit, the result of which conforms with the majority of all the evaluationcircuits. Let M = [m 1 , . . . , m n ] be P 1 's output from the j l -th circuit. Recall that P 2 has both m i and the signature to (m i , i, j l ), denoted by σ(m i , i, j), due to the way the garbled circuits were constructed. To prove the authenticity of m i , P 2 sends m i to P 1 , blinds signature δ(j l ) and σ(m i , i, j l ), and proves the knowledge of "σ(m i , i, j) for some j ∈ S." In other words, P 2 needs to prove the knowledge of σ(m i , i, j) and δ(j * ) such that j = j * for i = 1, . . . , n. The complete proof is shown in Protocol 1. Due to the nonforgeability property of signature schemes, P 2 proves the knowledge of the signature and thus the authenticity of M.
One particular implementation of our protocol can use the Boneh-Boyen short signature scheme [2] which is briefly summarized here. The Boneh-Boyen signature scheme requires the q-SDH (Strong Diffie-Hellman) assumption 5 and bilinear maps 6 . Based on these two objects, the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme includes a three-tuple of efficient algorithms (G, S, V ) such that 1. G(1 k ) generates key pair (sk, vk) such that sk = x ∈ Z * p and vk = (p, g, G 1 , X), where G 1 is a group of prime order p, g is a generator of G 1 , and X = g x . 2. S(sk, m) signs the message m with the signing key sk by σ(m) = g 1/(x+m) . 3. V (vk, m, σ) verifies the signature σ with vk by calculating e(σ, g m X). If the result equals e(g, g), V outputs valid; otherwise, V outputs invalid.
Protocol 1: Proof of P 1 's output authenticity
, the indices of the evaluation-circuits S = {j1, . . . , je} and the public key (p, G, g, X, Y ) of the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme. In particular, X = g x , and Y = g y . P1 Input: the corresponding private key (x, y) of the signature scheme.
P2 P2 picks u1, . . . , un, v ∈ Zp and computes Ui ← σ(bi, i, j l )
P2 P2 picks α, β1, . . . , βn, γ ∈ Zp and sends [a1, . . . , an, b] to P1, where ai ← e(Ui, g) α e(g, g) P2 P2 sends zα ← α+c·j l , z β i ← βi−c·ui, and zγ ← γ−c·v back to P1, who checks ai
P1 aborts if any of the checks fails.
Committing Oblivious Transfer
The oblivious transfer (OT) primitive, introduced by Rabin [21] , and extended by Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [5] and Brassard, Crépeau and Robert [3] works 5 q-SDF assumption in a group G of prime order p states that given g, g x , g
it is infeasible to output a pair (c, g 1/(x+c) ) where c ∈ Z * p . 6 Let G1 and G2 be two groups of prime order p. A bilinear map is a map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 with the following properties: (1) for any u, v ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z, e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab ; (2) for any generator g of G1, e(g, g) = 1; and (3) for any u, v ∈ G1, it is easy to compute e(u, v).
as follows: there is a sender with messages [m 1 , . . . , m n ] and a receiver with a selection value σ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The receiver wishes to retrieve m σ from the sender in such a way that (1) the sender does not "learn" anything about the receiver's choice σ and (2) the receiver "learns" only m σ and nothing about any other message m i for i = σ. Kiraz and Schoenmakers [10] Protocol 2 constructively proves Theorem 1. This protocol is a simple modification of the OT protocols designed by Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters [19] and later Lindell and Pinkas [14] . We simply add a ZK proof of knowledge in intermediate steps. Intuitively, the receiver-security is achieved due to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and the fact that the ZK proof of knowledge is independent of the receiver's input. On the other hand, the sender security comes from the uniform distributions of X i,j and Y i,j over G given that r i,j and s i,j are uniformly chosen and that the ZK proof has an ideal-world simulator for the verifier (or the receiver in the OT). As described in [15] , it is possible to batch the oblivious transfer operations so that all n input keys (one for each bit) to s copies of the garbled circuit are transferred in one execution.
Main Protocol
Here we put all the pieces together to form the complete protocol. Note that com h (K; t) denotes a perfectly-hiding commitment to K with opening t, and com b (K; t) denotes a perfectly-binding commitment to K with opening t.
Common input: a security parameters k, a statistical security parameter s, a malleable claw-free collection (G clw , D clw , F clw , R clw ), a signature scheme (G sig , S sig , V sig ), a two-universal hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k , and the description of a boolean circuit C computing f (x, y) = (f 1 , f 2 ), where |x| = 2n (including the extra n-bit random input) and |y| = |f 1 | = |f 2 | = n.
Protocol 2: Oblivious transfer for retrieving P 2 's input keys [14] Common
Private input: P 1 has the original input x 1 . . . x n and the extra random input x = x n+1 . . . x 2n , while P 2 has input y = y 1 y 2 . . . y n . Private output: P 1 receives output f 1 (x, y), while P 2 receives output f 2 (x, y).
1. P 2 runs the index selecting algorithm I ← G clw (1 k ) and sends I to P 1 . 2. Committing OT for P 2 's input: For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and every 1 ≤ j ≤ s, P 1 picks a random pair of k-bit strings (K
, which is associated with P 2 's i-th input wire in the j-th circuit. Both parties then conduct n instances of committing OT in parallel. In the i-th instance, 5. Cut-and-choose: P 1 and P 2 conduct the coin flipping protocol to generate a random tape, by which they agree on a set of check-circuits. Let T be the resulting set, that is, T ⊂ {1, . . . , s} and |T | = 3s/5. For every j ∈ T , P 1 sends to P 2 P 1 s of garbled circuit GC j , including [K Step 2) representing P 2 's input y. So P 2 is able to do the evaluation on circuit GC j and get P 1 's output [m 1,j ||σ(m 1,j ), . . . , m n,j ||σ(m n,j )] and P 2 's output [n 1,j , . . . , n n,j ], where m i,j , n i,j ∈ {0, 1}. Let M j = [m 1,j , . . . , m n,j ] and N j = [n 1,j , . . . , n n,j ] be the n-bit outputs for P 1 and P 2 , respectively. P 2 then chooses index j l such that M j l and N j l appear more than e/2 times in vectors [M j1 , . . . , M je ] and [N j1 , . . . , N je ], respectively. P 2 sends M j l to P 1 and takes N j l as her final output. If no such j l exists, P 2 aborts. 8. Verification to P 1 's output: To convince P 1 the authenticity of M j l without revealing j l , P 1 generates another signature key pair (sk 2 , pk 2 ). Then P 1 signs the indices of all the evaluation-circuits and sends the results to P 2 . In particular, P 1 sends to P 2 the public key pk 2 and a signature vector [δ(j 1 ), . . . , δ(j e )], where δ(j) = S sig (sk 2 , j). The signature is verified by P 2 by checking V sig (pk 2 , j, δ(j)) = valid, for every j ∈ {j 1 , . . . , j e }. Next, P 2 proves to P 1 in witness-indistinguishable sense the knowledge of σ(m i,j l , i, j) (a signature signed with sk 1 ) and δ(j * ) (a signature signed with sk 2 ) such that j and j * are equivalent, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. P 1 aborts if the proof is not valid; otherwise, P 1 takes M j l ⊕ (x n+1 , . . . , x 2n ) as her final output.
Theorem 2. Let f : {0, 1}
n ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n be any function. Given a secure committing oblivious transfer protocol, a perfectly-hiding commitment scheme, a perfectly-binding commitment scheme, a malleable claw-free family, and a pseudo-random function family, the Main protocol securely computes f .
We have omitted the standard simulation-based definition of "securely computes f " for space. Roughly, this definition requires a simulator for the corrupted evaluator, and a simulator for the corrupted generator that is able to generate transcripts given only oracle access to either the evaluator or generator (respectively) that are indistinguishable from the transcripts produced in real interactions between the corrupted generator and honest evaluator or honest generator and corrupted evaluator. (A simulator for when both parties are corrupted is also required but trivial.) The proof of Theorem 2 is omitted for space.
Experimental Results
We produced an implementation of our protocol to demonstrate its practical benefits. Our implementation takes the boolean circuit generated by Fairplay compiler as input. The encryption function used to construct garbled gates is defined as Enc J,K (m) = (m⊕SHA-256(J)⊕SHA-256(K)) 1...k , where |J| = |K| = |m| = k, and S 1...k denotes the least significant k bits of S. Here SHA-256 is modeled as a pseudorandom function. The choice of SHA-256 is to make a fair comparison as it is used in [20] .
# Gates
Time [20] .
Following Pinkas et. al [20] , we set the security level to 2 −40 and the security parameter k (key length) to 128-bit. In the first experiment, P 1 and P 2 hold a 32-bit input x = (x 31 x 30 . . . x 0 ) 2 and y = (y 31 y 30 . . . y 0 ) 2 , respectively. They want to compute f (x, y) = (f 1 , f 2 ) such that after the secure computation, P 1 receives f 1 = 31 i=0 x i ⊕ y i , and P 2 receives f 2 as the result of comparison between x and y. The 6 gates of overhead we incur in the first experiment relate to our method for two-output functions. In the second experiment, P 2 has a 128-bit message block while P 1 has a 128-bit encryption key. They want to securely compute the AES encryption, and only P 2 gets the ciphertext.
We ran our experiments on two machines: slower and fast, where slower runs OS X 10.5 with Intel Core 2 Duo 2.8 GHz and 2GB RAM, and fast runs CentOS with Intel Xeon Quad Core E5506 2.13 GHz and 8GB RAM. slower is not as powerful as the machine used in [20] (Intel Core 2 Duo 3.0 GHz, 4GB RAM), and fast is the next closest machine that we have. Table 2 reports the best numbers from [20] . We note that [20] applies the Garbled Row Reduction technique so that even non-XOR gates can save 25% of the communication overhead. A future version of our protocol can also reap this 25% reduction since the technique is compatible with our protocol.
Our implementation involves a program for P 1 and one for P 2 . For the purpose of timing, we wrote another program that encapsulates both of these programs and feeds the output of one as the input of the other and vice versa. Timing routines are added around each major step of the protocol and tabulated in Table 3 . This timing method eliminates any overhead due to network transmission, which we cannot reliably compare. The reported values are the averages from 5 runs.
We implemented our solution with the PBC (Pairing Based Cryptography) library [1] for testing. The components of our protocol, including the claw-free collections, the generator's input consistency check, and the generator's output validity check, are built on top of the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 +3 over the field F q for some 80-bit prime q. We have made systems-level modifications to the random bit sampling function of the PBC library (essentially to cache file handles and eliminate unnecessary systems calls).
In Table 4 , we list the results of the MAC-based two-output function handling and ours. The MAC approach introduces extra 16,384 (128 2 ) non-XOR gates to the AES circuit, whereas the original AES circuit has only 11,286 non-XOR gates. Since the number of non-XOR gates is almost doubled in the MAC-based approach, their circuit construction and evaluation need time about twice as much as ours. Moreover, the MAC-based approach has twice as many input bits as ours so that the time for P 1 's input consistency has doubled. [20] (which also ensures the cheating probability is limited below 2 −40 ). Table 4 : Computation time (in seconds) of f (x, y) = (AES x (y), λ) running on machine slower under different two-output handling methods.
A Optimal Choice in Cut-and-Choose Strategy
According to the cut-and-choose strategy, P 2 chooses e copies of the garbled circuits and asks P 1 to open the rest (s − e). After the verification, P 2 evaluates the rest e copies of the circuits and takes the majority output as her output. A natural question is: Under the assumption that P 1 's inputs are consistent, how many circuits does P 2 evaluate in order to minimize the probability for P 1 's best cheating strategy to succeed?
The assumption is valid due to the consistency check on P 1 's input. Given that s and e are fixed and known to P 1 , let b be the number of bad circuits created by P 1 . A circuit is bad if either the circuit is wrongly constructed or P 2 's inputs are selectively failed via OT. The goal is to find e and b such that the probability that P 1 cheats without getting caught
We first claim that P 1 's best cheating strategy is to produce b = e/2 + 1 bad circuits. Indeed, if b ≤ e/2 , P 2 's output will not get affected since the faulty outputs will be overwhelmed by majority good ones. Also, the more bad circuits, the more likely that P 1 will get caught since
s−e . So the best strategy for P 1 to succeed in cheating is to construct as few bad circuits as possible while the majority of evaluation circuits are bad, which justifies the choice of b.
Our next goal is to find the e that minimizes Pr(e) = . In summary, Pr even (e) is minimal when e = 2 α ; Pr odd (e) is minimal when e = 2 β + 1, and Pr(e)'s minimum is one of them.
B Security Proof for Theorem 2
Malicious evaluator P * 2
Recall that in this case P 1 follows the Main protocol faithfully. To prove that
for all x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , consider the following hybrid experiments and lemmas.
This hybrid experiment is the same as the real experiment Real except the oblivious transfers. During the OT, the experiment runs the OT simulator S ot , the existence of which comes from Theorem 1. Let y * i be the query that S ot requests to the OT oracle in the i-th OT instance.
The experiment generates key vectors ([K
, and uses these key vectors to answer S ot 's query so that P * 2 gets [K
Proof. The only difference between Hybrid 1 and Real is that S ot is invoked in Hybrid 1 . After this step, both experiments are identical since the experiment acts exactly the same as P 1 does in Real. So this lemma follows from the simulation property of the secure OT protocol in Theorem 1. In particular, the identical distribution of key vectors and commitments is being used by S ot .
Hybrid 2 (P 1 (x), P * 2 (y), 1 k ): This is the same as Hybrid 1 except the coin-flipping phase. In particular, instead of running the coin-flipping protocol like what P 1 and P * 2 would do in the Main protocol, the experiment chooses a random string ρ, and runs the coin-flipping simulator S cf (ρ, 1 k ) to generate the protocol transcript whose output is ρ.
Proof. Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 differ only in the way that transcripts of coinflipping protocol are generated. Intuitively, the lemma follows from property (3) of Theorem ?? because the coin-flipping simulator S cf is given black-box access to P * 2 and input ρ. More formally, suppose that there exists a distinguisher D that for infinitely many k, distinguishes Hybrid 1 from Hybrid 2 with probability Pr(k). We use D to construct D that distinguishes tran(P 1 , S cf (ρ, 1 k )) from tran(P 1 , P * 2 ) as follows: Let x, y be inputs for which D has the greatest probability of distinguishing Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 . (These values are given as non-uniform advice for security parameter k.) On input a transcript tran, D first runs Hybrid 1 (P 1 (x), P * 2 (y), 1 k ) until the point that the coin-flipping protocol occurs. Recall that tran consists of the view of both parties of the coin-flipping protocol. This includes the random coins of both parties and the messages exchanged. At this point, D extracts the random tapes r 1 , r 2 of both parties from tran, and splices these into the random tapes for P 1 and for P * 2 (without loss of generality, we can assume that neither P 1 nor P * 2 has accessed these coins yet). D then feeds the messages from the transcript tran to both parties until the coin-flipping protocol completes. At this point, D continues the rest of Hybrid 2 to completion. Then D runs D on the final transcript and echoes the result. Notice that when tran is generated by the real coin-flipping protocol, D outputs Hybrid 1 ; and when tran is generated by the coin-flipping simulator, D outputs Hybrid 2 . Thus, D distinguishes the coin-flipping simulator with probability Pr(k), which implies that Pr(k) must be negligible and therefore establishes the lemma.
This is the same experiment as Hybrid 2 except that the garbled circuits sent to P * 2 are modified as follows: The experiment generates a challenge set T ⊂ {1, . . . , s} where |T | = 3s/5 based on the random tape ρ. If j ∈ T , then GC j is the garbled version of C * as per Step 3 of the Main protocol; otherwise, GC j is constructed as per Claim 8 of [13] computing the constant function, which outputs N for all input x, y ∈ {0, 1} n . Recall that N is P * 2 's output returned from the external oracle after the experiment sends y * to it.
Proof. Note that the two hybrid experiments differ only in the way the garbled circuits are constructed. Intuitively, assuming perfectly binding/hiding commitments and secure symmetric encryption, this lemma follows from Claim 8 given in [13] and copied below for convenience.
Lemma 4 (Claim 8 of [13] ). Given a boolean circuit C computing function f and an output value z, it is possible to efficiently construct a garbled circuit GC such that 1. For all inputs, the output of GC is always z, 2. If z = f (x, y) for some x and y, then no non-uniform probabilistic polynomialtime adversary can distinguish between the distribution ensemble consisting of {GC , K x , K y } where K x , K y are the garbled keys for arbitrary x , y , and the ensemble consisting of {GC, K x , K y } where GC is a real garbled version of C, and K x , K y are the garbled keys representing inputs x, y.
Formally, let [GC 1 , . . . , GC s ] be the garbled circuits in Hybrid 2 and [GC 1 , . . . , GC s ] be the fake garbled circuits in Hybrid 3 . (Technically, only 40% among [GC 1 , . . . , GC s ] are fake. In each fake circuit, only P 2 's output gates are modified to output the constant N .) Let Hybrid 2,i be the same as Hybrid 2 except that for the first i elements j 1 , . . . , j i in the challenge set T , circuit GC ji is used instead of GC ji . Observe that Hybrid 2,0 = Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 2,s = Hybrid 3 . Suppose that there exists some x, y and some probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D such that for infinitely many k, D distinguishes Hybrid 2 from Hybrid 3 with probability Pr(k). Then by averaging, there must be some i such that D distinguishes Hybrid 2,i from Hybrid 2,i+1 with probability Pr(k)/s. With such distinguisher D, an algorithm D distinguishing {GC , K x , K y * } from {GC, K x , K y * } can be constructed as follows: On input either {GC , K x , K y * } or {GC, K x , K y * }, D first simulates Hybrid 2,i except that D uses its input for the (i + 1)st garbled circuit, and completes the rest of experiment Hybrid 2,i . Then D runs D on the resulting transcript and echo D's output. D does a perfect simulation of either Hybrid 2,i or Hybrid 2,i+1 , and therefore distinguishes garbled circuits with probability Pr(k)/s. By Lemma 4, Pr(k) must be negligible and we complete the proof. Note that both Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 still use the real input keys {K x }.
Hybrid 4 (P 1 (x), P * 2 (y)): This is the same as hybrid experiment Hybrid 3 with the exception that in the consistency check the experiment uses input 0 2n instead of input (x, c).
Proof. Intuitively, the idea is to substitute P 1 's input (x, c) with 0 2n bit by bit. Each of the substitutions is indistinguishable from the previous one due to the witness indistinguishable property of the consistency check protocol. Formally, let Hybrid 3,i be the same experiment as Hybrid 3 except 0's are used for the first i bits instead of x 1 , . . . , x i . Recall that x i is the i-th bit of P 1 's input (x, c), where |x| = |c| = n. In other words, experiment Hybrid 3,i uses (0, . . . , 0, x i+1 , . . . , x 2n ) rather than (x 1 , . . . , x i , x i+1 , . . . , x 2n ) used by By the identical range (for the first halves of both messages) and the uniform domain (for the second halves) properties of the malleable claw-free collections, the two tuples are statistically indistinguishable. Thus, the lemma holds.
This is the same as experiment Hybrid 4 with the exception that experiment Hybrid 5 sends abort to the external oracle if the last proof protocol is invalid. Afterwards, S 2 outputs whatever P * 2 outputs.
This follows immediately from the soundness of the WI proof in the last step.
Lemma 7. The simulator S P * 2 2 runs in expected polynomial time.
Proof. Since P * 2 is a strict polynomial-time adversary, most of the steps of the simulation are also strictly polynomial-time except the running of OT simulator S ot , and the running of coin-flipping simulator S cf . Thus, the running time of simulator S 2 can be expressed as p(k) + r ot + r cf where r ot and r cf are random variables denoting the running time of S ot and S cf . This lemma follows because both S ot and S cf occur only once, i.e., they are never rewound or part of a loop. Thus, the overall running time is expected polynomial time by linearity of expectations.
Finally, since Ideal(P 1 (x), S P * 2 (y) 2 , 1 k ) and Hybrid 5 are syntactically similar, by Lemma 1-7, we prove the security of the Main protocol when P 2 is malicious.
Malicious generator P * 1 :
In this case, P 2 follows the Main protocol faithfully. Let Real(P * 1 (x), P 2 (y), 1 k ) be P * 1 's and P 2 's outputs from the Main protocol with P * 1 using x and P 2 using y. To prove that Real(P * 1 (x), P 2 (y), 1 k ) and Ideal(S
, P 2 (y), 1 k ) are indistinguishable for all x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , consider the following hybrid experiments.
Hybrid 1 (P * 1 (x), P 2 (y), 1 k ): This is the same as Real(P * 1 (x), P 2 (y), 1 k ) except that if P * 1 passes the first cut-and-choose test, the experiment repeatedly rewinds P * 1 over the cut-and-choose process, including the coin-flipping protocol and the verification of the chosen circuits, until P * 1 passes for the second time. Let T i be the challenge set of the i-th successful cut-and-choose, and T = T 1 \T 2 . If over the course of these two successful cut-and-choose test |T | = 0, then the experiment aborts.
Proof. The main idea behind the indistinguishability between these two experiment is if P * 1 never passes the cut-and-choose test, both Real and Hybrid 1 abort right after the cut-and-choose stage. Once P * 1 passes the test for the first time (even with small probability), experiment Hybrid 1 is able to have P * 1 pass another cut-and-choose test after expected polynomially many rewinds. The goal here is to prove that Pr[|T | = 0] is negligible.
Let T be the collection of all the possible challenge sets in the cut-andchoose test, that is, T = {A|A ⊂ {1, . . . , s} and |A| = 3s/5}. Next, let X be a random variable over T representing the chosen challenge set and success be the event that P * 1 passes the cut-and-choose. Since the coin-flipping protocol always produces independently and uniformly distribution random bits, each rewind is independent. Moreover, between the first and the second successful cut-and-choose tests, there might be many rewinds when P * 1 fails the test. Thus,
Since X distributes uniformly over T and Pr[X = t & success|X = t] ≤ 1, we have
Therefore, the lemma holds.
This is the same as Hybrid 1 except the experiment aborts if P * 1 's input cannot be extracted correctly. More specifically, recall that for all j ∈ T , garbled circuit GC j has been opened during the first successful cut-and-choose. However, at this step P * 1 expects circuit GC j to be evaluated and is supposed to reveal [M 1,j , . . . , M 2n,j ]. So the experiment is able to extract P * 1 's i-th bit x * i by comparing M i,j with the range elements associated with P * 1 's i-th bit in GC j . In particular, for j ∈ T , if M i,j is the range element associated with bit value 0 in GC j , then x * i,j ← 0; else if M i,j is the range element associated with bit value 1 in GC j , then x * i,j ← 1; otherwise, the experiment aborts (Fail 1 ). Since |T | > 0, the experiment has |T | possible 2n-bit input for P 1 . The experiment aborts (Fail 2 ) if these inputs are inconsistent, that is, x * i,j = x * i,j for j = j .
Proof. Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 differ only when the experiment continues in Hybrid 1 but aborts in Hybrid 2 , that is, either Fail 1 or Fail 2 happens. Recall that for j ∈ T garbled circuit GC j passes the check in the first successful cutand-choose, and thus, the commitments to F clw (0, I, m , which by the claw-free property of the malleable claw-free collections happens only with negligible probability. * 1 (x), P 2 (y), 1 k ): This is the same as Hybrid 4 except that the experiment does not evaluate any of the garbled circuits.
Proof. The only concern here is that Hybrid 4 might abort because of not evaluating circuits successfully (no output appears more than s/5 times and referred by event Fail 3 ), whereas Hybrid 5 does not evaluate the circuits, and thus, never abort for the same reason. In other words, we need to argue that Pr(Fail 3 ) is negligible, which is straightforward as claimed in Lemma 10.
This is the same as Hybrid 5 except that the experiment uses a random input y instead of y in the OT protocol.
Proof. By the receiver-security property of the OT protocol (Theorem 1), these two experiments are indistinguishable during the OT phase. We then need to argue that after the OT phase, the probability experiment Hybrid 5 using y aborts is statistically close to the probability experiment Hybrid 6 using y aborts. In particular, the probability of abort is independent of the choice of y.
Recall that when the key received from OT does not match the key used to construct the corresponding input gate, the garbled circuit is not evaluable. The issue is that garbled circuit GC j may be evaluable in Hybrid 5 but not in Hybrid 6 . Without loss of generality, consider a specific input bit where y i = 0 and y i = 1. Let {K 0 i,j , K 1 i,j } be the input keys that P * 1 uses to construct GC j . If both keys are corrupted, GC j is not evaluable in both experiments, and thus, Hybrid 5 and Hybrid 6 react in exactly the same way as per Main protocol. In particular, a corrupt key in OT could be trash ⊥ so that the receiver detects P * 1 's cheating right after OT. Next, consider the case that P * 1 only corrupts one of the keys. Namely, P * 1 uses {K 0 i,j , K 
If GC j is a check-circuit during the cut-andchoose phase, by the computationally-binding property of the committing OT, P * 1 has to decommit com h (K * i,j ) to K * i,j . Hence, both experiments will detect that K * i,j is not the right key used to contruct garble circuit GC j , and thus, both abort. On the other hand, GC j could be one of the evaluation-circuits. Recall that Hybrid 5 does not evaluate any garbled circuits, and neither does Hybrid 6 . In other words, wheather GC j is corrupted or not does not cause Hybrid 5 and Hybrid 6 to abort during the circuit evaluation phase or after. Therefore, we conclude that the case Hybrid 5 aborts and the case Hybrid 6 aborts are exactly the same despite the choice of y. Proof. Every step of the simulator except the rewinding step finishes in expected polynomial time. Thus, it remains to analyze the time spent during the rewinding. Let p 1 be the probability that P * 1 succeeds in opening circuits the first time (that is, P * 1 successfully opens the circuits specified by the result of the coin-flipping protocol, and each circuit passes the verification checks run by P 2 ). With probability p 1 , simulator S 1 will then proceed to re-execute the coin-flipping protocol and the open step until it completes one more openings. Since S 1 uses completely random coins when re-running these steps that are independent of all prior executions, it is expected that after O( 1 p1 ) executions, S 1 produces another successful opening with high probability. Thus, the expected number of the rewinding is p 1 · O( 1 p1 ) = O(1). Since each rewinding requires polynomial time in k, the total time spent for this step is polynomial in k.
Finally, note that Hybrid 4 (P * 1 (x), P 2 (y), 1 k ) and Ideal(S
, P 2 (y), 1 k ) are syntactically similar. In particular, P 2 's input is no longer used. By Lemma 8-14, we prove the security of the Main protocol when P 1 is malicious.
Simulator 5: For P * 2
Common input: a security parameters k, a statistical security parameter s, a malleable claw-free collection (Gclw, Dclw, Fclw, Rclw), a signature scheme (Gsig, Ssig, Vsig), a two-universal hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k , and a description of boolean circuit C computing function f (x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y) ), where |x| = |y| = |f1(x, y)| = |f2(x, y)| = n.
Wait for the index I to malleable claw-free collections from P *
Committing OT for P2's input: 
S2
Garbled circuit construction: Transform C into a circuit C * computing f * ((x, c), y) = (f1(x, y)⊕c, f2(x, y)), where |x| = |c| = |y| = n. Invoke Gsig(1 k ) to generate a signature key pair (sk1, vk1) and Dclw(I) to generate m i,j , generate GCj as follows: if j ∈ T , GCj is a garbled version of C * as described in the Main protocol; otherwise, GCj is a garbled circuit that always outputs N as described in [13] . Cut-and-Choose: Run coin-flipping simulator Scf(ρ). Recall that by Theorem ??, Scf(ρ) forces the output of the coin-flipping protocol to be ρ, with which T is determined.
{GC j } j∈T -P * 2
For every j ∈ T , reveal circuit GCj by sending P * 2 all the openings to GCj and decommitting to (Fclw(0, I, m Circuit evaluation: Wait for M = {m1, . . . , mn} ∈ {0, 1} n from P * 2 . S2 p1 ouptut -P * 2
Verification to P1's output: Invoke Gsig(1 k ) to generate another signature key pair (sk2, vk2). Send to P * 2 the public key and the signature of [j1, . . . , je], that is, vk2 and [δ(j1), . . . , δ(je)], where δ(j l ) = Ssig(sk2, j l ). Next, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, verify P * 2 's witnessindistinguishable proof of knowledge that P * 2 has mi's signature, the j-index of which coincides with some j ∈ {j1, . . . , je}. If P * 2 fails the proof, sent 0 to the external oracle for f indicating "do not deliver P1's output"; otherwise, send 1 indicating "deliver P1's output" and output whatever P * 2 outputs.
Simulator for P * 1
Common input: a security parameters k, a statistical security parameter s, a malleable claw-free collection (Gclw, Dclw, Fclw, Rclw), a signature scheme (Gsig, Ssig, Vsig), a two-universal hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k , and a description of boolean circuit C computing function f (x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y) ), where |x| = |y| = |f1(x, y)| = |f2(x, y)| = n. P * 1 I
S1
Runs the index selecting algorithm I ← Gclw(1 k ) and sends the result I to P * 1 . P * 1 ot -
Committing OT for P1's input: Pick random y = y 1 . . . y n ∈ {0, 1} n and use y i as the input in the i-th committing OT instance with P * -S1 Cut-and-choose (2nd time): Rewind P * 1 to run the cut-and-choose process (coin-flipping plus the checking of the 3s/5 chosen circuits) until P * 1 passes the process for the second time. Let T2 be the challenge set of the second successful cut-and-choose and let T = T1\T2. Abort if |T | = 0. Note that for j ∈ T , garbled circuit GCj is a check-circuit in the first successful cut-and-choose but an evaluation-circuit hereafter. 
Circuit evaluation: Extract P * 1 's input by comparing [M1,j, . . . , M2n,j] with the openings of GCj, for all j ∈ T . Abort if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, j ∈ T , Mi,j do not match the group elements associated with P * 1 's i-th input bit in garbled circuit GCj (Fail1) or these |T | extracted 2n-bit inputs are inconsistent (Fail2). Let (x * , x * ) be the extracted result, where |x * | = |x * | = n. Send x * to the external oracle and get f1(x * , y) in return. Then M = f1(x * , y) ⊕ x * is sent to P * 1 . P * 1 p1 output -
Wait for the public signature key vk2 and a signature vector [δ(j1), . . . , δ(je)]. Confirm the validity of these signatures by checking Vsig(vk2, j l , δ(j l )) = valid, for 1 ≤ l ≤ e. Let j l be an element from T and M = [m1, . . . , mn]. Prove to P
